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Abstract : We analyse the coarse, the fine, and the private information
core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information.
The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are:
(i) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation
of information in each coalition occur; and (ii) take into account the
information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover,
the above three concepts are examined in the presence of externalities
and a comparison and interpretation of all of these core notions is
provided.
We wish to thank Stefan Krasa and Anne Villamil for several useful
suggestions. Obviously we are responsible for all errors.

1. INTRODUCTION
The idea of an exchange economy with differential information
[i.e., an economy consisting of a finite set of traders each of whom is
characterized by a state dependent (random) utility function, a random
initial endowment, a private information set, and a prior], was
introduced by Radner (1968). The equilibrium notion that Radner (1968)
adopted to analyze trade among agents in an economy with differential
information (we will sometimes call such an economy as a Radner-type
economy) was the Walrasian equilibrium. Since the Walrasian equilibrium
notion is noncooperative it precludes cooperation among groups of
agents. Thus, we adopt the core, a cooperative solution concept, in
order to analyze the trade among agents in a Radner-type economy. We
will argue that not only does the core provide more sensible outcomes
than the Walrasian equilibrium, but it is also coalitionally incentive
compatible (i.e., there is truthful revelation of information in each
coalition) and it takes into account explicitly the information
advantage or superiority of an agent.
Throughout the paper we will denote the private information set of
agent i (which is going to be a partition of a measure space) by J-. We
will examine first versions of the coarse core of Wilson (1978), where
the blocking net trades of a coalition S are A /--measurable' and
ies '
therefore the information is common knowledge to each member of the
1 The symbol A I- denotes the "meet," i.e., the maximal partition
ies '
contained in all J- . Moreover, the symbol V /. denotes the "join,"
1 ies
i.e., the minimal partition containing all /j. By an abuse of notation
we will denote throughout the paper, the o-algebra generated by the
partition J. also by I-.
2coalition. We next examine the fine core concept of Wilson (1978),
where the blocking net trades of a coalition S are V /.-measurable and
ies
hence the information is pooled by the members of the coalition.
Finally, we examine the private information core of Yannelis (1991),
where the blocking net trade of each member of the coalition is
/--measurable and thus there is no symmetric information in the
coalition, contrary to the coarse and fine core.
We will show that the coarse core exists, it is coalitionally
incentive compatible (i.e., there is truthful revelation of information
in each coalition) and it takes into account the information superiority
of an individual. However, since the coarse core always contains the
private information core and the latter exists and has the above
properties, we will conclude that we learn nothing new from the coarse
core that cannot be learned from the private information core. In fact
as we will show by means of an example, the coarse core is "too large,"
i.e., all the individually rational and Pareto optimal allocations
constitute the coarse core.
Contrary to the coarse core, the basic problem with the fine core
is that it is "too small" and in general it does not exist. Moreover,
whenever it does exist we will show that it is not coalitionally
incentive compatible and it does not take into account the information
superiority of an individual. The analysis of these core concepts
suggests that the private information core may be the appropriate core
notion in an exchange economy with differential information. This
concept exists under standard continuity and concavity assumptions on
the utility functions, is coalitionally incentive compatible, and takes
3into account the information superiority of an agent. Moreover, we show
that the private information core can be used to model the idea of an
intermediary [see Boyd-Prescott (1986) as well]. In particular, an
intermediary is an agent with "better" information than all other agents
who by using his/her superior information, executes the correct trades.
The idea of an intermediary arises endogenously and naturally in our
framework. Our results suggest that cooperative solution concepts may
be quite useful for analyzing trade in economies with differential
information and may be useful for tackling basic issues in the theory of
financial markets.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains notation
and the economic model. Several core notions are defined in Section 3
and some preliminary results are proved as well. Section 4 focuses
mainly on the incentive compatibility of the private information core.
The interpretation of the different core concepts is given in Section 5.
Section 6 introduces different core notions in the presence of
externalities, and an existence result is proved in Section 7.
Section 8 contains some concluding remarks. Finally, in Section 9 we
compare the core with the value allocation of Krasa-Yannelis (1991).
2. NOTATION AND THE ECONOMIC MODEL
Before we outline our model we begin with some notation.
2.1 Notation
Rn denotes the n-dimensional Euclidean space.
R denotes the positive cone of Rn .
R denotes the strictly positive cone of Rn .
2A denotes the set of all subsets of the set A.
P denotes the empty set.
\ denotes set-theoretic subtraction.
|a| denotes the cardinality of the set A.
If (Q,&, n) is a measure space, then /- will always denote a
measurable partition of fi and E-(g>) will denote the element of the
partition f. which contains oeQ. If X is a linear topological space,
its dual is the space X of all continuous linear functionals on X.
2.2 The Exchange Economy with Differential Information
Let Y denote the commodity space. For simplicity one may identify
Y with the positive cone of 8 . However, all the results in this paper
remain true if Y is the positive cone of any Banach lattice with an
order continuous norm whose dual has the Radon-Nikodym Property (RNP). 2
Therefore, one can allow for infinitely many commodities. Denote by
(Q,?, (J) a probability measure space. An exchange economy with
differential information & is given by & = { (X- ,u- , e- ,¥• ,/j) : i=l,2,...,n}
where
(1) X- : fl-»2 Y is the consumption set of agent i,
(2) Uj : Y-»R is the utility function of agent i,
(3) / is a (measurable) partition of Q denoting the private
information of agent i,
(4) e-: Q-»Y is the initial endowment of agent i, where each ej
is /.-measurable (Bochner) integrable and ej(o)) e X-(&))
fj-a.e.
See Section 7 for rigorous definitions.
5(5) /j is a probability measure on n denoting the common prior of
each agent.
The expected utility of agent i is given by
f UjfXjfw) ) d\i(<a) .
ueQ
A possible interpretation of the above economy is the following: one
may think that there are two periods where actual consumption takes
place in the second period. In period one there is uncertainty over the
states of nature and in this period agents make agreements which may be
contingent on the realized state of nature in the second period. It is
important to note that in this setting agents have differential
information with respect to the realized state of nature and know their
endowment realization (i.e., the initial endowment of each agent is /--
measurable) . Note that a common prior assumption has been adopted in
this framework. However, one may allow for different priors,
Bayesian updating, and random utility functions as follows: let
q- : fi-^R
++
be a Radon-Nikodym derivative having the property that
[ qi (o) du (to) =1, which denotes the prior of agent i. For each i
veQ
(i=l,2,...,n) , denote by E^o) the event in /,= containing the realized
state of nature ueQ, and suppose that f qi (s) d\i(s) > 0. Given
E-(ti)) e /• define the conditional expected utility of agent i as:
j u i (s,xi (s))qi (s\Ei (<ji) )d\i(s) ,
se£j(«4)
where
gi (s|Ei (ci>)) = Qi(s)
f qi (s)d\i(s)
if S $ ^(co)
if SE Ei (0i)
Note that all the results of this paper remain valid if we use the
alternative conditional expected utility for formulation. We choose not
to adopt the latter modeling for simplicity of exposition and easier
calculation of our examples introduced later in the paper.
3. CORE NOTIONS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
In this section we define several different core notions for an
exchange economy with differential information.
3. 1 The Private Information Core
The following core notion was introduced in Yannelis (1991,
Definition 3.1.1, p. 187). It was subsequently used by Allen (1991) who
refers to it as the private information core.
n
Definition 3.1 : An allocation x: Q - IJ-Xj is said to be a
i-l
private information core allocation for #, if the following conditions
hold:
7(i) each x- is /^-measurable;
n i
(ii) Vx^o)) =Vei (&>) \a-a.e.;
i-l i-l
(iii) it is not true that there exist S c {l,2,...,n} and
y: Q"*TI^i' such that each y i is /--measurable for all ieS,
16S
J^yi ((i)) =^ei (o)) \i-a.e. and
ieS ieS
J
ui (yi (a))) dji(<i)) > fui (x1 ((M>))d\i(<n) for all ieS.
Condition (i) implies that the net trade of each agent, i.e.,
x
1
--e
i
is /j -measurable (recall that each e,- is /,- -measurable) and
consequently each agent knows his/her own net trade realization.
Condition (ii) says that the markets are cleared for almost all
n
states of nature. Note that since 52 (^i (<«>) - ©i (w) ) = 0, \i-a.e. and by
i-l
n
(i) each x^ - e- is /--measurable, it follows that J^ (xi (-) -et (') ) is
i-l
n
V /--measurable and therefore, the grand coalition knows their
i-l '
aggregate net trade realization.
(iii) says that it is not possible for a coalition of agents to
get together, redistribute their resources among themselves (while each
agent in the coalition use his/her own private information) and make the
expected utility of each agent in the coalition better off. Observe
that in (iii) the fact that each y- is /-measurable for all ieS implies
that y- - e- is /. -measurable for each ieS and consequently
S(yt (•) -e± [•) ) is V /-measurable, i.e., there is pooling of, Its
information in each coalition.
It should be noted that the measurability assumptions in (i) and
(iii) are equivalent to the fact that:
8(i') Each x- - e^ is /--measurable, and
(ii') it is not true that there exist S and y: Q^JJxi# such that
i€S
Yj - e^ is /--measurable for all ieS,
53yi (o)) =y^ei ((o) \i-a.e. and f^iy^dvi > /'ui (xi )dji for all
ies its J J
ieS.
Pick now arbitrarily an agent j in the coalition S. Note that since in
(iii) above, J2 (y.i (')
~ e i (') )
= °» by rearranging we have that
its
Bj(') -yj(') = 52 (Yi (*) ~ei (") ) • Since ej-y: is /.-measurable and
T^ (yi -^/) is V /.-measurable, it is always the case that within a
coalition say S the |s-l| members of the coalition can pool their
private information and verify the net trades of the remaining agent.
The following theorem proved in Yannelis (1991) provides
sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence of a private
information core allocation for &. The commodity space Y can be the
positive cone of any Banach lattice with an order continuous norm whose
dual has the RND property.
Theorem 3.1 ; Let #= { (X-,u-,e-,/- ,/j) : i=l,2,...,n} be an exchange
economy with differential information, satisfying the following
assumptions for each i ( i=l,2 ,..., n) :
(a. 3.1) Xj-: Q-»2 Y is a convex, closed, nonempty valued
correspondence
;
3It should be emphasized that the fact that |s-l| members of the
coalition S can pool their information and verify the net trades of the
remaining agent does not necessarily mean that they will verify the true
private information of that agent. The remaining agent may have an
incentive to report a false private information set. We will address
however, the question as to whether there is truthful revelation of
information in each coalition in Section 4.
9(a. 3. 2) e-: fl-»Y is integrably bounded;
(a. 3. 3) u-: Y->R is weakly continuous, integrably bounded and
concave.
Then a private information core allocation exists in %.
Note that in Theorem 3.1 in Yannelis (1991), the set-valued
function X- : n-»2 is assumed to be integrably bounded and /-measurable
as well. The latter assumption was needed to show [see Yannelis (1991,
p. 191)] that the set Lx which is defined to be a set of all Bochner
integrable and /--measurable selections from the set-valued function
X- : fi-»2 Y , is nonempty. However, by adding (a. 3. 2.) above, i.e., e- : Q-»Y
is integrably bounded (recall that ej : fi-»Y is also Bochner integrable
and /--measurable), we can conclude that e^ e Lx and hence the set Lx
is indeed nonempty. This change in assumptions allows us to relax the
separability assumption on the commodity space. [Recall that the
separability assumption in Yannelis (1991) was needed in one step only,
in particular it was used to make the Aumann measurable selection
theorem applicable and show that Lx is nonempty. ]
3.2 The Coarse Core
The following definition of a coarse core allocation is taken from
Yannelis (1991, p. 187). It is a variation of the coarse core concept
first introduced by Wilson (1978) [see also Kobayashi (1980)].
a
Definition 3.2 ; An allocation x: Q - TJ Xs is said to be a coarse
core allocation for #, if the following conditions hold:
(i) Each x. is /.-measurable;
10
ii n
(ii) ^^(o)) =Vei (&>) \i-a.e.;
i-l iT\
(iii) It is not true that there exist S c {l,2,...,n} and
y: Q-TTx, such that y- is A /.-measurable for all ieS,
Vy^w) =J^ei (a>) \i-a.e. and
ies ies
j ^(y^o) ) d\i (o>) > J Uj (xi (to) ) d|i (o>) for all ieS.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are discussed above. Condition (iii) says
that it is not possible for a coalition of agents by redistributing
their initial endowments (based on information which is common knowledge
to the coalition) to make the expected utility of each agent in the
coalition better off. More formally note that since each y- is A /.
-
1 ies '
measurable for each ieS it follows that y^y,(0 is A /--measurable and
we can conclude that X* (y^ (•) -e, (•) ) is A /-measurable. Therefore the
its ^
net trade of a coalition is based on common knowledge information.
We now state a result on the existence of coarse core allocations
that follows directly from Theorem 3.1 in Yannelis (1991), simply by
noticing that the set of all private information core allocations for %
is a strict subset of the set of all coarse core allocations for £".
Theorem 3.2 ; Let % = { (X, ,u- ,e- ,/• ,ju) : i=l,2,...,n} be an exchange
economy with differential information satisfying for each i ( i=l, 2 ,... ,n)
all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 above). Then a coarse core
allocation exists in #.
11
Note that if condition (i) in Definition 3.2 is replaced by
(i') Each x, is A /.-measurable,
1 iei '
then we will indicate in Section 5 that such a coarse core notion which
we will call here as a strong coarse core allocation for &, may not
exist. In particular, we show in Section 5 that there exist private
information exchange economies satisfying all the assumptions of Theorem
3.2, but a strong coarse core allocation may not exist. Note that what
we call here a "strong coarse core" corresponds to the "coarse core" in
Allen (1991). It is exactly for this reason that Allen (1991) concludes
that the strong coarse core may be empty.
3.3 The Fine Core
The following core notion is taken from Yannelis (1991, p. 188)
and is a variant of the fine core concept introduced by Wilson (1978).
a
Definition 3.3 : An allocation x: Q - TJ X1 is said to be a fine
core allocation for & if the following conditions hold:
(i) Each x- is /.-measurable.
n n
(ii) Vx-^co) =52ei (o) \i-a.e.
1T\ i-l
(iii) It is not true that there exist S c {l,2,...,n} and
y: Q-TTXj, such that y- is V /.-measurable for all ieS,
Vyi (a)) = J^ei ((i>) \i-a.e. and
fu1 (yi (<i>)) d\i((o) > lu1 (x1 (.(i>))d\i((ti) for all ieS.
12
Since conditions (i) and (ii) are the same with those in
Definition 3 . 1 we only need to interpret condition (iii). The latter
condition says that no coalition of agents can redistribute their own
initial endowment using their pooled information and make every member
in the coalition better off. Formally, since each y ; is V J.-
measurable for each i e S, and by definition each e- is /.-measurable,
it follows that the net trades y.-e- is V J. -measurable for each ieS.11 ies '
Hence, we can conclude that net trades are now based on pooled
information of the coalition. It was remarked in Yannelis (1991,
p. 188) that the above fine core may be empty. 4 In Section 5 we show
by means of an example (which satisfies all the assumptions of Theorem
3.1) that indeed the fine core may be empty.
If condition (i) in Definition 3.3 is replaced by
n
(i') Each x- is V J. -measurable,
1 i-l
then we will call such a core notion a weak fine core allocation
for r. 5
The theorem below indicates that a weak fine core allocation
exists in £".
^Wilson (1978) has already shown by means of an example that his
fine core notion may be empty. However, his example is not entirely
consistent with the above notion. Recall that in the Wilson setting
allocations and endowments are not necessarily measurable. In a public
finance setting Berliant (1990) has also shown that a fine core-type
notion may not exist.
Clearly the set of all fine core allocations for % is a strict
subset of the set of weak fine core allocations for 9.
13
Theorem 3.3 : Let % - { (X- ,u- , e- , /- ,pi) : i=l,2,...,n} be an exchange
economy with differential information satisfying for each i ( i=l, 2 , ..., n)
all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1. Then a weak fine core allocation
exists in &.
Proof ; It follows directly from Theorem 3.1 as follows. For
S c {l,2,...,n} denote V /. by /s . Define Lx as: Lx . = {xi : xi :Q"Y isies J i
Bochner integrable, V /s-measurable and -xv,(g>) eLfu) \i-a.e.}. By
Scl
n
Theorem 3.1 there exists an xe \\LX , such that:
i-i
a n
(i) Vx^w) = Ve^co) \i-a.e.
(ii) It is not true that there exist S and (y^)^ 6 IjA* such
ies
that y^yjfw) = J^e i ((i)) ji-a.e. and fui (yi )d\i > fui (x1 )d\i for
lis fis ** ^
all ieS.
Observe that since xe JjA* each Xj is V f. -measurable . (ii)
i-i i_1
implies that condition (iii) of Definition 3.3 holds. To see this,
suppose otherwise than there exist Sci and y: Q-FJx,, such that y- is
ies
V /.-measurable y^y.(o)) = V e^co) ii-a.e. and /iMyJdji > \uAxAd\x for
^s ' fts ffs
all ieS. Since y- is V /--measurable it is also V / s-measurable and
1 Sci
therefore y e Lx , a contradiction to condition (ii) above. Hence, we
cone.:lude that x: Q - JJ xi i- s a weak fine core allocation for % and this
completes the proof.
14
It should be noted that our definition of a weak fine core
allocation for ^corresponds to Allen's (1991) fine core allocation
for %, who has proved a finite dimensional version of Theorem 3.3.
4. TRUTHFUL REVELATION OF INFORMATION IN THE CORE
One of the basic questions that one may ask is whether the core
notions defined in the previous section are coalitionally incentive
compatible. That is, is there truthful revelation of information in
each coalition? We show below that indeed the private information, the
coarse, and the fine cores are incentive compatible. We define
rigorously below a notion of incentive compatibility which was
introduced in Krasa-Yannelis (1991).
Definition 4.1 ; A feasible allocation is said to be coalitionally
incentive compatible if and only if the following does not hold: There
exists coalition Sci and two states a and b that members of I/S cannot
distinguish (i.e., a and b are in the same event of the partition for
every agent not in the coalition S) and such that members of S are
better off by announcing b whenever a has actually occurred. Formally,
n
the feasible allocation x: Q - fj Xt is said to be coalitional incentive
i-l
compatible for & if it is not true that we can find a coalition S and
states a,b with a e E(b) for every i€S, such that
u
f
(e
f
(a)-<-x
1
(b)-e
(
(b)) > u.(x.(a)) for all ieS.
The concept of a coalitionally incentive compatible allocation
captures the idea that within a coalition it is not possible for a
subcoalition to misreport their information and become better off.
15
It turns out that in the case of one commodity per state, if
preferences are monotone then the /--measurability of a feasible
allocation implies that the allocation is also coalitionally incentive
compatible. For the result below for each i, X- is a set-valued
function from Q to R
+ ,
i.e., there is only one good per state.
n
Propos it ion 4.1 ; Let x: Q - JJ X± be a feasible allocation for %.
i-i
Suppose that:
(i) Each x- is /--measurable,
(ii) For any y,z in R
+
and for each iel, if y > z then
u j(Y) > u j( z ) (monotonicity)
.
Then the allocation x is coalitionally incentive compatible.
Proof ; Suppose otherwise, then there exist Sci and a,b, a e E-(b)
for all i£S such that
(1) u1 (ei (a)+xi (i))-ei (Jb)) > u^x^a)) for all i€S.
Since x is feasible it follows that
£ (xi (-)-ei (0) = -T, (Jti (•)-«!(•) J •
163 its
Since by definition the initial endowment of each agent is /--measurable
and by assumption (i) each x- is /-measurable, it follows that x-e- is
/--measurable and consequently we can conclude that for any coalition
Tel, the sum Y* (x, (•) -e, (•) ) is V /.-measurable. Since a e E-(b) for
fri. ler
16
every i€S it follows that ae V\EAb) . Clearly C\EAb) is an element of
its its
V /. . By the above reasoning the sum \^ {xi (•) -ei (•) ) isits its
V /.-measurable and therefore we can conclude that
(2) £ (xi (a)-e1 {a)) = T (xt (b) -e± (b)
)
i«S its
Hence,
T (x1 (a)-ei (a)) = -V (x, (a) -e± {a)
)
IeS its
(3) = -£ {Xi (b) -e± {b) ) (recall (2))
2<S
We now show that x.- (a)-e- (a) = Xi(b)-e.-(b) for all ieS. Suppose
otherwise, i.e., x-(a)-e-(a) * x_- (b)-e.- (b) for some ieS. Without loss of
generality we may assume that x-(b)-e-(b) > x-(a)-e-(a) for some ieS. It
follows from (3) that x-(a)-e-(a) > x-(b)-e-(b) for some agent jeS.
Since Xj(a) > x (b) -e- (b)+e- (a) it follows from assumption (ii) that
Uj(Xj(a)) > Uj{Xj(b) -ej{b) +e
j/
(a) ) for some jeS,
a contradiction to (1). Hence, we conclude that x-(a)-e-(a) =
x,- (bj-e,- (b) for all ieS. But then u,- (e,- (a)+x
f
(bj-e,- (b) ) =
u-(e- (a)+x-(a)-e. (a) ) = u-(x-(a)) for all ieS, a contradiction to (1).
This completes the proof of the proposition.
17
It follows now directly from Proposition 4.1 that any private
information, coarse, or fine core allocation of the one commodity per
state economy % is coalitionally incentive compatible provided that
preferences are monotone. The following Corollary of Proposition 4.1
holds:
Corollary 4.1 ; Let % = { (X- ,u- ,e- ,J. ,\i) : i=l,2,...,n} be an exchange
economy with differential information satisfying assumption (ii) of
n
Theorem 4.1. If x: Q - TJ Xi is either a private information, a coarse
i-i
or a fine core allocation for %, then x is coalitionally incentive
compatible.
We focus now on the private information core of % and show that it
is always coalitionally incentive compatible provided that preferences
are monotone. The one good per state assumption is now dropped. Before
stating the main result of this section, we modify Definition 4.1 to
permit a continuum of states.
n
Definition 4.2 ; A feasible allocation x: Q - JJ XL is said to be
i-l
weak coalitionally incentive compatible for %, if it is not true that
there exist coalition S and states a,b in Q such that:
(i) Et {a) e A^"i# VL(E± la)) > 0,les
(ii) a e E^ (b) for i£S, and
(iii) u^e^aj+x^bj-e^b)) > u
{
(x
f
(a)) for all ieS.
This notion of incentive compatibility states that it is not
possible for any coalition S to become better off by announcing a false
18
state, which agents not in the coalition S cannot distinguish from the
true state. Conditions (ii) and (iii) are the same as in Definition
4.1. Condition (i) says that the members of the coalition S should
agree on whether a state has occurred. In other words, the event
containing the realized (misreported) state a, i.e., E-(a) is known to
the coalition and since /u(E-(a)) > there is a non-negligible
possibility for misreporting.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section:
Theorem 4.1 ; Let % = { (X. # u. ,e.,/. ,/j) : i=l,2,...,n} be an exchange
economy with differential information satisfying for each i ( i=l, 2...,n)
,
all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1. Moreover, suppose that preferences
are monotone. Then any private information core allocation for & is
weak coalitionally incentive compatible.
Proof ; Let x be a private information core allocation for &. For
each i, define z-: Q-»X- by z- ( • ) = x- ( • ) - e^ ( • ) .
Suppose that x is not weakly coalitionally incentive compatible.
Then there exist Scl and a,b e fi such that:
(i) Ei (a) € A & ^(^(a)) > 0,ies
(ii) a e E-(b), i€S, and
(iii) u
f
(e
{
(a)+s
{
(b)) > u
f
(x,(a)) for all ieS.
First notice that since e- (
•
) and x-(«) are /--measurable (iii) implies
that for all ieS, u- (e
]
(t )+z- (b) ) > u. (x-(t)) for all t e E,- (a).
Since a e E.(b) for all i£S we have that ae HEAb) . Clearly
1 its
PI EAb) eV/.
its US
19
We know that E zi (-) is V J. -measurable and since a € C\ £,(£>) we
Its l*s its
conclude that E z1 (a) = E z1 (b) . By the feasibility of x we have that
its its
E zx (.a) = ~E ^(a) and thus
1€5 its
(3) E zi< a > E zi (jb>-
its ies
Consider now the following net trades: 6
( 4 ) Z-(t) = ZiUJXQV^a, + Zi^HLEi i a ) for ies -
The above net trades are /--measurable (since each z,- is /-measurable)
and feasible. Indeed, since Ei (a) f A ^ it follows that for t € E-(a)
ies '
Z|(t) = z^a) for all ieS. Hence, if t $ E-(a), E z j ( fc ) + E zi ^ ^) -
E zi ( t) =0 (recall the feasibility of x)
.
If t e E,.(a), e zi (t) + E z i (t) = £ zi (i) + E zi (t) =
ieS its ies its
V Ziib)
- E *j<t) E zi (i>) ~E Zi(a) =0 (by < 3 ^* We can nowies 165 ies ies
construct the following allocation. For each i, ( i=l,2,...,n) let
Xi(')
ei (0 + z;(-) , ies
Notice that for all ieS, u
1
-
(x.(t)) = u^ (e- (t )+z^ (b) ) > u- (x-(t)) for
t e E-(a)). Since ji(E(a)) > 0, we have that
The symbol % below denotes the characteristic function. See also
Section 7.
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ju1 (Xi(t))d\i(t) > fui (xi (t))d\i(t) for all ies, and
ju1 (Xi(t))d\i(t) = fu i (xi (t))d\i(t) for all i$S.
Since Ju1 {-) is weakly-continuous [Claim 4.1 in Yannelis (1991)] it is
also norm-continuous. Hence, by choosing A
€
A. &~
±
with /j(A) > 0, we can
lei
find a function e«xA / where e > 0, such that for e sufficiently small,
I c%A l < 5 so that
<
5 ) jui^xl-zxjdyi. > fuiix^dp for all ies.
By monotonicity of preferences for i€S, uJx/(t) +
-i—=
—
r e
'X^) > ui (xi {t))
for teA. Since \jl (A) > we have that:
(6) / ui(x'* + Tj7s[ eXA ) dkl
> [ ui {xi )dV- for a11 ic5 -
Hence, the allocation:
Xi
Xi - zxA , ies
Ws\ tx" US
is /j -measurable (since it is x. perturbed over a measurable set), it is
feasible for the grand coalition and it follows from (5) and (6) that
Jui (x**)dji > fui (x)d\i for all i, ( i=l,2,...,n) , a contradiction to the
fact that x has been assumed to be a private core allocation for £".
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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Remark 4.1 ; Although the theorem says that any private
information core allocation is weakly coalitionally incentive
compatible, the proof shows that a stronger result is true, i.e., any
private information Pareto optimal allocation [see Yannelis (1991),
Definition 3.1.2, p. 188] will be weakly coalitionally incentive
compatible as well.
5. INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVATE INFORMATION
COARSE AND FINE CORE ALLOCATIONS
In an economy with differential information it is reasonable to
expect that an agent with even a zero initial endowment but better
(finer) private information than all other agents that matters to the
rest of the agents, should be able to exchange his/her superior private
information for actual goods. Obviously, this is not the case if we
adopt as an equilibrium notion the traditional Walrasian equilibrium
(i.e., any rational expectations equilibrium notion). In particular, in
the Walrasian equilibrium if an agent has no initial endowment, even if
his/her information is better and essential to all the other agents,
he/she always ends up with zero consumption (simply note that in any
Walrasian equilibrium notion this agent will have to maximize his/her
expected utility conditional on his/her own private information, subject
to a budget set which is zero) . We believe that for an equilibrium
notion to be suitable in a differential information economy framework it
should be able to reward an agent with superior information provided
that the information matters to the rest of the agents (even if this
agent has no endowment of physical good) . The example below
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demonstrates that this is the case for the private information core and
the coarse core, but not for the fine core.
Example 5.1 ; Consider an economy with three agents denoted by
J,K,L and four states of nature denoted by a,b,c,d. There is only one
good in each state. The random initial endowments of the agents are
given as follows: Agent J's is (20,20,2,20), agent K's is (10,4,10,10)
and agent L's is (0,0,0,0). Their private information sets are:
7, = {{a,b,d},{c}}, IK = {{a,c,d},{b}} and J^ = {{a,d}, {b,c}} . All
agents have the same utility function given by log x and each state
occurs with the same probability.
5. 1 The Private Information Core
The above example satisfies all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 and
therefore a private information core allocation exists in this three-
person exchange economy with differential information. We show that in
a private information core allocation agent L will have positive
consumption. First note that since the net trade of each agent must be
/--measurable, J and K together cannot make any beneficial trades, i.e.,
the only trades possible between J and K are state independent and these
trades do not improve them. However, the participation of agent L in
the economy makes everybody better off. In fact it can be easily
checked that the following allocation
(5.1)
(18, 18, 3, 18)
(9, 6, 9, 9)
(3, 0, 0, 3)
for i = J
for i = K
for i = L,
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is a private information core allocation, i.e., x. is ^-measurable,
feasible and it cannot be dominated by any coalition.
In this example, agents J and K cannot undertake any risk sharing
without agent L. Since agent L has superior information he/she acts as
an intermediary who executes the correct trades and as a consequence
gets rewarded for this service. All three agents are better off after
trade has taken place (simply note that x. for i=J,K,L is individually
rational, i.e., fui (x*) d\i £ jUj^ie) d\i) . In sharp contrast with the core
notion, if we had adopted the Walrasian equilibrium then agent L would
have obtained zero consumption since he/she started with zero initial
endowments, no matter whether agent L's information is useful to the
other agents.
If the private information of agent L were not useful to agents J
and K then agent L would have obtained zero consumption. For instance
if the private information set of agent L is /, = {a,b,c,d} then the
initial endowment is the unique private information core allocation.
This result is quite interesting because our example indicates that the
private information core takes into account the information advantage or
superiority of an individual in an explicit way. It is exactly for this
reason that we believe that the private information core serves to
provide more plausible outcomes than the Walrasian equilibrium.
5 . 2 Coarse Core
Let us now examine the coarse core allocation. We know that any
private information core allocation is also a coarse core allocation.
Hence the private core allocation (5.1) is a coarse core allocation as
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well. 7 To show that the coarse core allocation takes into account the
superiority or information advantage of an agent simply observe that if
agent L's private information in Example 5.1 were the trivial partition,
i.e., /
L
= {a,b,c,d}, then the initial endowment is the only coarse core
allocation, where agent L receives zero in all states.
The strong coarse core in this example is empty. Simply note that
the strong coarse core allocation must be (&j A &"K A &"L ) -measurable,
but the meet of these three partitions is the trivial partition, i.e.,
&~j A &"K A &~L = {a,b, c,d}. This implies that the consumption of each
agent must be the same in each state. However, given the structure of
the initial endowments it is easily seen that no feasible allocation can
give to each agent the same consumption in all states and dominate the
initial endowments. Moreover the initial endowment state is not a
strong coarse allocation since it is not (&"j A &"K A &"L ) -measurable.
Hence the strong coarse core is empty in this example.
5 . 3 Fine Core
We now show that the fine core is empty in Example 5.1. To see
this note that any J- -measurable allocation (i=J,K,L) which is
beneficial to agents J and K can be achieved only through agent L and
this agent ends up with positive consumption (e.g., the allocation in
(5.1)) in states {a,d}. Since improvements for agents J and K can be
7In fact it can be shown that in this example all /--measurable
(i=J,K,L) allocations x which are individually rational (i.e.,
[u(x)d\i £ fu(e)du) constitute the coarse core.
8Except from the initial endowment which is dominated by the
allocation in (5.1).
25
made with {&~j V K^ ) -measurable allocations and {a,d} belongs to
STj V &K = {{a,d} , {b} , {c}} , it follows that all ^-measurable (i=J,K,L)
allocations are blocked by the coalition {J,K} which in turn can share
agent L's consumption in states {a,d}, e.g., the allocation in (5.1) can
be dominated by the following allocation:
Yi =
[(20, 18, 3, 20) for i = J
(10, 6, 9, 10) for i = K
(0, 0, 0, 0) for i = L,
Hence, we can conclude that the fine core is empty.
However, the weak fine core exists. It can be easily checked that
the allocation
(15, 12, 6, 15) for i=J,K
Yi
"
(0, 0, 0, 0) for i=L
is in the weak fine core. However, it is not incentive compatible.
Simply note that if state a occurs then agent J can become better off by
reporting state c and the latter state is not distinguishable from a by
agent K. In particular, Uj (ej(a)+x- (c)-ej(c) ) = Uj(20+4) > Uj(x,(a)) =
u, (15). Using the same reasoning the reader can verify that agent K can
become better off by reporting state b whenever state a occurs.
In contrast with the private information core, the information
superiority of agent L is not taken into account by the fine core.
Indeed, if agent L's partition is either J. = {a,b,c,d} or
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J. = {{a}
,
{b}, {d}
,
{c}} the above weak fine core allocation remains
unchanged (compare with the private information core).
5.4 The Unequal Treatment of the Private Information Core
In Example 5.1 the agent with zero initial endowments and superior
information useful to the rest of the economy facilitated the trades,
i.e., he/she served as an intermediary. Obviously, by executing the
correct trades he/she made all other agents better off (Pareto
improvement) and was compensated for this service by consuming some of
the goods.
We now provide an example with two intermediaries.
Example 5.4.1 ; Consider the Example 5.1 with one additional agent
M whose initial endowment is zero in each state, he/she has the same
utility function with the other three agents, i.e., log x and let
his/her private information set be /
M
= { {a,d} , {b} , {c} } . (Agent's J, K,
L initial endowments and partitions remain the same as in Example 5.1.)
Clearly, the above four-person economy with differential
information satisfies all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 and therefore a
private information core allocation exists. We will show that agents L
and M can serve as intermediaries. One can easily check that the
allocation:
Xi
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(18, 18, 3, 18) for i = J
(9, 6, 9, 9) for i = K
(ilt 0, 0, f2 ) for i = L, tx ,l2 ;>
(/nlf 0, 0, m2 ) for i = M, m^,m2 z.
where 2. + m
1
3, i> 2 + m2 = 3, is a private information core allocation.
Obviously either agent L or M may serve as an intermediary or both may
serve simultaneously. Their final allocation in states a and d depends
on the extent that their information was used to carry out the trades.
Note that even if agent M has the same partition as agent L, i.e.,
J^ = { {a,d} , {b,c}} = /L , the set of private information core allocations
remains the same. Hence, one can conclude that there is no equal
treatment , i.e., agents with identical characteristics (utility
function, initial endowment, and private information set) may receive
different utility private information core allocations. 9 Notice that
the value allocation of an economy with differential information as
defined in Krasa-Yannelis (1991) does not have the equal treatment
property as well [just endow each agent in the Scafuri-Yannelis (1984)
example with the same private information set which is the full
information partition]
.
5. 5 Independence of Private Information Sets
It should be noted that whether trade takes place or not depends
crucially on the structure of the information (or the initial
endowments) in a private information economy. In particular, we show
In particular, the final allocation of each intermediary depends
on the volume of trades that they carry through.
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below that in a differential information economy with one good per state
if the private information sets of the agents are independent (a term
which is defined below) then trade does not take place. Obviously, in
this case there is no need for an intermediary. Hence, we can conclude
that a sufficient condition for trade to take place is that the private
information sets should not be independent.
We begin with a definition.
Definition 5.2 ; Let % = { (X- ,u.,e- ,/. ,\i) : i=l,2,...,n} be a private
information economy. We say that J. is independent of I- , i* j
,
' J
(i, j=l,2,...,n) if pj(ADB) = pi(A)*/j(B) for Aef. and Be 7.
.
It can be easily shown that the above definition implies
independence of the initial endowments (recall that each e- is /--
measurable ) , i.e.,
f[e
t (&)) -ejia) ] d\i(a>) = (e^u) d\i (o>) •jej ( <o ) d|i ( <•>
)
for i#j, (i, j=l,2,...,n) .
We are ready now to state the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 ; Let % be an exchange economy with private
information satisfying all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1. Moreover,
suppose that there is only one good per state, preferences are monotone,
and that each /- is independent of /- , i* j . Then the unique private
information core allocation is the initial endowment.
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The proof of this proposition follows directly from the following
two Lemmata. Indeed if there is a private information core allocation
* * *
say x (•) = (x (• ),..., x (•)) (other than the initial endowment), then by
setting for each iel, z-(u) = x.(u) - e^u) /j-a.e. and letting I=S in
Lemma 5.2 below we can conclude that
J
e 1 ( co ) dji ( <o ) > l xl (g>) d\i (o>) , i.e.,
x is not individually rational.
Lemma 5.1 ; Let % = { (X-,u-,e-,/.,/j) : i=l,2,...,n} be an exchange
economy with differential information satisfying the assumptions of
Proposition 5.2. Consider a coalition S whose members have independent
partitions. If for each ieS, z-s Q-*X- is the net trade of agent i which
is /.-measurable and ^zi (o)) = \t-a.e., then for each ieS either
fes
z((i)) < ^i-a.e., or z-(o) > jj-a.e.
Proof : Choose an agent i in S. Since J^ z i (-) =0 it follows that
ies
(5.4.1) zi<*> " "E zi (,)
I* 1jes
Since each z- is /--measurable it follows that -Vz.-(-) is V /--
J J H itijes Je5
measurable and therefore by virtue of (5.4.1) we can conclude that Zj (
•
)
is V /--measurable. Since z- ( • ) is V /--measurable the set
j*i ' ' j*i '
jes jes
z7 1 ([0,«»]) = {o>eQ: Ziito) € [0,«] } = {oeQ: z^w) ;> 0} belongs to
/.fl ( V/.) . Since /• is independent of /- i*j, i,j in S, it follows
j»i J ' J
that /• is independent of V /. . Since z71 ([0,«]) is y, fl ( V &) -
1 >i J i*i
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measurable, z/ 1 (•) is independent to itself. Hence,
liUi'Mo,*] nz^dO,-])) = n(Zi_1 [0,H) •H(zj1 [0 f «"]) and so
li (z/1 [0,~] ) = [ji (zj" 1 [0,~] ) ] 2 . The latter enable us to conclude that
either u (zj 1 [0, «>] ) = or |x (z/ 1 [0, »] ) =1, i.e., either for p-a.e.
z.(Ci>) < or z-(u) > /j-a.e.
Lemma 5.2 ; Let % be an exchange economy with differential
information satisfying all the assumptions of Proposition 5.2. Then
given a coalition S where net trades z- (
•
) are /--measurable for all ieS
and y^zi ((j) = u-a.e., no trades can be beneficial to all i in S
its
(i.e., f ui (ei +zi ) du < fui (e i )d\i for some i in S).
Proof ; By Lemma 5.2 for each ieS, either z.-(a) 5 or Zj(u) <
/i-a.e. We will show that whenever z- (
•
) is either positive or negative
for some i in S it will violate individual rationality. Since the case
where z
T
-(&>) = jj-a.e. is trivial, we will only prove the case that for
some ieS, z^(o>) > /j-a.e. (The case where for some ieS, Zj(&>) <
/j-a.e. can be proved along the same lines.) Since for some ieS,
z-(g>) > /j-a.e. and T^zi (a>) = u-a.e., it must be the case that for at
ieS
least one jeS, z(u) < fj-a.e. Hence, e-(u) + Zj(u) < e:(o>) fj-a.e. By
monotonicity we have that u- (e- (a)+z- (u) ) < u(e((i))) jj-a.e. and
therefore jUj (e^ (<o) +Zj (<•>) ) du (&>) <
J
Uj (e^ (o>) ) dp. (o>) . The above
inequality violates individual rationality for the agent j in S, and we
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can conclude that for coalition S, no net trade z- (
•
) which is J--
measurable and ^^(o)) = \i-a.e. is beneficial, to all agents i in S.
ieS
6. THE a-CORE OF AN ECONOMY WITH DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION
In this section we will allow for interdependent preferences
(i.e., externalities in consumption). In particular, the economy W will
be identical with that described in Section 3 except that now the
utility function of each agent i, is a real valued function defined on
n
\Yj- Hence the utility function of each agent depends not only on
his/her own consumption, but also on the consumption of all other
agents. We will denote such an economy by r.
We now define the notion of a private information a-core for r
which corresponds to the private information a-core strategy for a
normal form game which was defined in Yannelis (1991). We will first
need some notation. If Sci then (ys , z 1 I s ) denotes the vector x in J Yj
where x. = y. if ieS and x- = z- if i£S.
Definition 6.1 ; The allocation x: Q - JJ Xx is said to be a
private information a-core allocation for T if the following conditions
hold:
(i) Each x-: Q-»Xj is f- -measurable.
n n
(ii) 53^(0)) =y)ei (») \i-a.e.
1-1 i-l
(iii) It is not true that there exist Sci and y: Q
-TJ XL such
-165
that each yj is /j-measurable for all ieS,
J^y^a)) = Vej(u) \i-a.e. and fu i (y 3 , z x|5 ) d\i > Jui (x)d\i for
ies ieS
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all ieS and for any z r 's € ]J-^i# each z/'
5 is /--measurable
its
for all i£S and V^z^u) = y^e^w) ji-a.e.
lis 1(5
Conditions (i) and (ii) have been discussed in Section 3. (iii) says
that no coalition can redistribute their initial resources (while each
agent in the coalition is allowed to use his/her own private
information) and make the expected utility of each member better off for
any feasible redistribution of the complimentary coalition.
By replacing condition (iii) of Definition 6.1 by:
(iii') It is not true that there exist Sci and y: Q - T such that
each y, is A /--measurable for all ieS,
1 ieS '
Vy^o)) =
f^
e1 (,tii) \i-a.e. and JUily 3 , z r|5 ) d\i > fui (x)d\i for
fes ieS J J
all ieS and for any z 1^ € T] X
± ,
each z/ |s is A /,-
its *«
measurable for all itfS and ^ zi (a>) = ^Te^co) \i-a.e.,
its its
we have the notion of a coarse a-core allocation for r. Moreover if the
measurability assumptions in (iii') above on y^ and z l * s are replaced by:
each y- is V /.-measurable for all ieS and each z/'s is V /.-
1 ies ' its '
measurable for all i$S, we obtain the notion of a fine a-core allocation
for r.
In the next section we prove the existence of private information
a-core allocations for r.
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7. THE EXISTENCE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION a-CORE ALLOCATIONS
We begin with some basic definitions of mathematical nature which
will be needed for our existence proof.
7 . 1 Mathematical Preliminaries
Let (T,T,/j) be a finite measure space and X be a Banach space.
Following Diestel-Uhl (1977) the function fs T-»X is called simple if
n
there exist x,,,x
2
,...,x
n
in X and a^,a
2 ,...tan
in T such that f = J3 xiX a •
where x„.(t) =1 if tea,- and %_ ( t) =0 if ttfa,-. A function f: T-+X is
said to be ^-measurable if there exists a sequence of simple functions
f„: T-»X such that lim \fAt)-f{t)\ = for almost all teT. A
/i-measurable function f: T-»X is said to be Bochner intearable if there
exists a sequence of simple functions {f
n
s n=l,2,...} such that
lim f\fa (t)-f(t)\d\i(t) =
In this case we define for each EeT the integral to be
/\f (t)dji(t) = lim fn (t)d\i(t) . It can be shown [see Diestel-Uhl (1977),
e n-»
Theorem 2, p. 45] that if f: T-»X is a ^-measurable function then, f is
Bochner integrable if and only if f \f( t) \d\i (t) < <*>. It is important to
T
note that the Dominated Convergence Theorem holds for Bochner integrable
functions. In particular, if f
n
: T-»X, (n=l,2,...) is a sequence of
Bochner integrable functions such that lim fn (t) = f(t) \i-a.e., and
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|jfn (t)| < g(t) \i-a.e. , (where g: T-+R is an integrable function), then f is
Bochner integrable and lim f [fa (t) -f(t) \d\i(t) = 0.
For 1 < p < ~, we denote by L (/j,X) the space of equivalence
classes of X-valued Bochner integrable functions x: T-»X normed by
l|x|p = f/|x(t)Pdji(C)V
/P
.
It is a standard result that normed by the functional l°l D above,
L (/j,X) becomes a Banach space [see Diestel-Uhl (1977), p. 50]. Recall
that a correspondence <p% T-»2 X is said to be inteqrably bounded if there
exists a map h e L-(yj,R) such that sup{|x|: xe<£(t)} < h(t) jj-a.e.
A Banach space X has the Radon-Nikodvm Property with respect to
the measure space (T,T,^) if for each ^-continuous measure G: T-»X of
bounded variation there exists g e L.(/Lt,X) such that G(E) = fg{t)d\i(t)
E
for all EeT. A Banach space X has the Radon-Nikodym property (RNP) if X
has the RNP with respect to every finite measure space. Recall now [see
Diestel-Uhl (1977, Theorem 1, p. 98)] that if (T,T,/j) is a finite
measure space 1 < p < °°, and X is a Banach space, then X* has the RNP
if and only if (L
,
(u,X))* = L (u,X*) where — + — =1.
We now collect some basic results on Banach lattices [for an
excellent treatment see Aliprantis-Burkinshaw (1985)]. A Banach lattice
is a Banach space L equipped with an order relation > (i.e., > is a
reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation) satisfying:
(i) x > y implies x + z > y + z for every z in L,
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(ii) x > y implies Xx > \y for all X > 0,
(iii) for all x,y in L there exists a supremum (least upper bound) xVy
and an infimum (greatest lower bound) x A y,
(iv) |x| > |y| implies |x| > |y| for all x,y in L.
If x,y are elements of the Banach lattice L, then we define the
order interval [x,y] as follows:
[x,y] = {z€L: x i z 1 y} .
Note that [x,y] is norm closed and convex (hence weakly closed). A
Banach lattice L is said to have an order continuous norm if, x„ 4 in
L implies |x
a
| 4 0. A very useful result which will play an important
role in the sequel is that if L is a Banach lattice then the fact that L
has an order continuous norm is equivalent to weak compactness of the
order interval [x,z] = {yeL: x < y < z} for every x,z in L [see
Aliprantis-Burkinshaw ( 1985 ) ]
.
We finally note that Cartwright (1974) has shown that if X is a
Banach lattice with an order continuous form (or equivalent ly X has
weakly compact order intervals) then L^(/i,X) has weakly compact order
intervals, as well. Cartwright' s Theorem will play a crucial role in
our existence proof.
7 . 2 The Private Information a-Core Existence Proof
The following result provides sufficient conditions which
guarantee the existence of a private information a-core allocation for r
where III =2. If III >2 then the result below is false.
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Theorem 7.1 : Let T be an exchange economy with differential
information satisfying for each i, (i=l,2) the following assumptions,
(a. 7.1) Xjt n-»2 Y is a convex, closed, nonempty valued
correspondence
,
(a. 7. 2) e-: fi-»Y is integrably bounded,
a
(a. 7. 3) Ujiljy^-R is weakly continuous, integrably bounded
j'-i
and concave.
Then a private information a-core allocation exists in r.
Proof ; We first state the a-core existence theorem in Yannelis
(1991a) which will play a crucial role in our argument. Let
E = {(X-,u-,e-: i=l,2} be an exchange economy where
(1) X- the consumption set of agent i is a subset of the
positive cone of an ordered Hausdorff linear topological
space L, which is endowed with a topology t which is weaker
than the Hausdorff topology on L, t is a vector space
topology having the property that all order intervals in L
are r-compact.
a
(2) the utility function of each agent i, ut : IT-X^ - R is
j'-i
concave and -r-continuous.
(3) e- is the initial endowment of agent i, where e- e X- for
all i.
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If E satisfies (1), (2), and (3) it follows from Yannelis (1991a,
Theorem 4.1, p. 112) that an a-core allocation exists 10 in E.
We now construct a new economy r as follows? For each i, i=l,2
let Lx = {x- e L.j(/i,Y): Xj : n-*Y is Bochner integrable, J-measurable and
n
x-((i>) e X-((o) ^/-a.e.}. For each i define v^iTJl,^ -R by
v1 (x) = fui (x(<i>) ) d\i (o>) . Since by assumption (a. 7.2) e { is integrably
bounded e- e Lx (recall that ej ( • ) is /--measurable and e-(o>) e X(u)
p<-a.e. ) and therefore Lx is nonempty. Obviously Lx it is convex and
bounded from below. It follows from Claim 4.1 in Yannelis (1991,
p. 191) that v- is weakly continuous. Moreover, since u^ is concave so
is v.. We now have a new economy r = {
(
Lx , v., e- ) : i=l,2}, where
(a) Lx is the consumption set of agent i,
10To be more specific Yannelis (1991a) allows for preferences which
need not be ordered. In particular one only needs to assume that the
preference correspondence of agent i Pi :J|XJ -2 i "1 satisfies for each i
j'-i
the following assumptions:
(i) X, = Y,
a
(ii) x $ con P-(x) for all jfeTJ^ (where con denotes convex
r»i
hull)
,
a
(iii) P: has T-open lower sections (i.e., for every yeTJ-X^, the
i-l
set Pi
r
{y) = xe]]^: y e P^x)) is T-open in fl xi-
[ i-i J f-i
Note now that by defining the preference correspondence Pi : ; J Xj - 2
iml
by P(x) = {y: u(y) > u-(x)}, it follows from the concavity of u- that
n
P^ ( • ) is convex valued and clearly x € con Pj(x) = P(x) for all jreTJ^.
Moreover the r-continuity of u
i
implies that P^ has T-open lower
' n \ (a \
sections (in fact more is true, P^ has a T-open graph in \ xi x \] \ xi \) •
Hence, Theorem 4.1 of Yannelis (1991a) applies to the above setting.
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(b) v. is the utility function of agent i,
(c) e- e Lx is the initial endowment of agent i.
It can be easily seen that an a-core allocation of r is a private
information a-core allocation for r. Hence all we need to show is that
r satisfies the assumptions of Yannelis's (1991a) Theorem (i.e.,
conditions (1), (2), and (3) above).
Since Y is the positive cone of a Banach Lattice with an order
continuous norm, it follows from Cartwright's theorem that order
intervals are weakly compact in L.j(^,Y). Hence, the topology t in
Yannelis's (1991a) theorem is taken here to be the weak topology, and
obviously assumption (1) is satisfied. Also as noted above v- is
concave and weakly continuous and e^ e Lx for all i. Hence (2) and (3)
hold and therefore an a-core allocation exists in r. The latter implies
that a private information a-core allocation exists in r. This
completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 7.1 : One can easily see that the set of all private
information a-core allocations for r is contained in the set of all
coarse a-core allocations for r. However, for |l| =2 the coarse, fine
and the private information a-core allocations coincide. From this
observation and Theorem 7.1 we can obtain the following Corollary.
Corollary 7.1 : Let r be an exchange economy with differential
information satisfying for each i, (i=l,2) the assumptions of Theorem
7.1. Then a coarse and a fine a-core allocation exists in r.
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Remark 7.2 : Recently Holly (1991) has shown that in an exchange
economy (without incomplete information) where the set of agents is
greater than two, Yannelis's (1991a) a-core existence theorem ceases to
be true. It is straightforward to extend Holly's example to an exchange
economy with differential information and show that if |l| > 2 then the
coarse a-core of r is empty, and therefore so is the private information
a-core of r.
Remark 7.3 ; If the economy r has one good per state, then the
reader can easily verify that the private information, coarse and fine
a-core allocations for T are coalitional incentive compatible. The
proof of this result is similar with that in Proposition 4.1.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of different core notions in an economy with
differential information enables us to draw the following conclusions:
The private information core appears to be a sensible solution concept;
it exists under very mild assumptions, it is coalitionally incentive
compatible, and it takes into account the information superiority of an
individual. Moreover, our examples indicate that it provides reasonable
outcomes especially in situations where the traditional Walrasian
equilibrium concept fails to do so. The coarse core appears to have the
same properties as the private information core but since the latter
concept is a strict subset of the former it does not provide any
additional information. As our Example 5.1 indicated the coarse core is
"too big." Contrary to the coarse core the fine core is "too small" and
generally does not exist. However, whenever it exists (e.g., the weak
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fine core) it is not coalitionally incentive compatible and it does not
take into account the information advantage of an agent. Nonetheless,
we believe that the weak fine core may be useful for analyzing
situations of adverse selection. We also showed (Section 7) that all
the above core notions can be easily modified in order to allow for
externalities in consumption. Since the private information core can be
used to explain intermediation, it is our belief that this concept has
great potential in the theory of financial and incomplete markets. In
particular, the fact that the private information core rewards the
agents with superior information provides interesting insight into the
way that opportunities for financial intermediation or arbitrage arise
in economies with differential information.
We conclude by noting that our adoption of a cooperative solution
concept (e.g., the private information core) to analyse economies with
differential information seems to us very appealing. Indeed, in most
applications agents cooperate either bilaterally or multilaterally under
differential information. Although there is a non-cooperative feature
in the private information core notion, (i.e., private information sets
are not verifiable by each member of a coalition), the resulting
allocation is always coalitionally incentive compatible.
9. A COMPARISON WITH THE VALUE ALLOCATION
Krasa-Yannelis (1991) examined the cardinal value allocation in an
economy with differential information. Specifically, they analyzed the
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coarse, the fine, and the private information value allocation. 11 It
was shown that the coarse and the fine value allocations are problematic
(as is the case with the coarse and the fine core) but the private
information value allocation is coalitionally incentive compatible and
it takes into account the information superiority of an individual. The
latter two properties are shared by the private information core as
shown in this paper. Despite the fact that both concepts have the same
appealing properties, (i.e., they are coalitionally incentive compatible
and take into account the information superiority of an agent), they
redistribute the initial endowments guite differently. In particular, a
private information value allocation need not be a private information
core allocation and vice versa [see Example 5 in Krasa-Yannelis (1991)].
Thus, since the value and the core generate different outcomes, we
cannot say whether one concept is better than the other. The decision
for choosing the private information value over the private information
core (or vice versa) should be based on the economic behavior that we
intend to explain or rationalize. For instance, in modeling economic
behavior where the bargaining power of an individual in a private
information economy plays an important role the value seems in this
situation more suitable than the core.
H-NY.2-14
Since the private information value allocation turns out to be
coalitionally incentive compatible it was called by Krasa-Yannelis a
coalitionally incentive compatible value allocation.
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